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It is important to distinguish between the claims embodied in seventeenth-century matter 
theories of the kind defended by the mechanical philosophers and the new experimental 
science. The former were general theories of the ultimate structure of matter defended mainly 
by appeal to notions ofintelligibility, or some such thing. The latter involved localised claims 
about specific phenomena that were defended by experiment. Insofar as the matter theories 
had empirical support it was of a very weak kind. They were accommodated to the phenomena 
rather than being confirmed by the phenomena in the way that experimental knowledge could 
be and often was. 
 
The philosophical distinctions, between ultimate matter theories and items of experimental 
knowledge and between accommodation to and confirmation by the phenomena, are 
important for an adequate understanding of what was scientific about the scientific revolution 
of the seventeenth century. In this paper I defend this claim, and defend myself against the 
charge that I am imposing contemporary distinctions on the past, in the context of the work of 
Robert Boyle.  
 
Boyle in fact made explicit and to some extent put into practice versions of the distinctions 
introduced above. He invoked a scale of causes and explanations ranked according to their 
degree of empirical accessibility. He distinguished between ‘intermediate’ causes and 
explanations accessible to experimental exploration and ultimate mechanical causes that were 
remote from what could be accessed empirically. Examples of the former are the weightand 
spring of the air invoked by Boyle to explain a range of pneumatic phenomena and which could 
be explored by experiments such as those involving the air pump.  The latter involved causes 
and explanations that invoke the shapes, sizes and motions of portions of impenetrable matter 
that conformed to the dictates of Boyle’s mechanical matter theory.  
 
On the face of it, Boyle’s distinction between empirically accessible knowledge of intermediate 
causes and knowledge of remote mechanical causes is difficultto reconcile with his oft-repeated 
claim that his mechanical matter theory had empirical support. The problem is removed once it 
is recognised that the kind of support Boyle considered his mechanical theory to have had was 
of a weaker kind than the stringent kind of experimental support he demanded of his 
experimental claims. Mechanical matter theory, according to Boyle, is supported by 
experimental knowledge of a phenomenon to the extent that a mechanism conforming to the 
dictates of his matter theory canbe contrived that would be capable of reproducing that 
phenomenon. Arguments of this kind are especially effective if the phenomenon 
accommodated poses problems for rival matter theories (such as those involving immutable 
substantial forms, for example). There is no requirement here that there be evidence that the 
contrived mechanism is the one actually existing in nature. Boyle illustrated with an analogy. 
Mystery about the regular motion of the hands of a watch can be removed by proposing a 
mechanism that would be capable of reproducing that motion. The proposed mechanism is 
unlikely to conform to the actual one, but at least its construction removes the need to assume 
the watch is animated. 
 
I have three observations to make about this kind of support. Firstly, it is a very weak kind of 
support. Boyle inadvertently highlighted this fact when he stressed the flexibility of the 
mechanical philosophy stemming from the very wide variety of shapes, sizes and motions that 
can be attributed to the ultimate mechanical particles. Whatever this degree of flexibility, it was 
not sufficient to undermine my second point, namely, that there were common phenomena 
that Boyle could not accommodate in his matter theory. Leaving aside chemical and biological 
phenomena that posed difficulties, the spring and weight of air involved in Boyle’s pneumatics 
had proved resistant to attempts to explain them mechanically as Boyle freely and explicitly 
acknowledged. My third point is that, even if it is admitted that mechanical matter theory had 
empirical support in some sense, that sense differed from the strong kind of support that Boyle 
required of experimental knowledge. As a consequence, my insistence on the significance of 
the distinction between the status and character of mechanical matter theory and experimental 
knowledge such as Boyle’s pneumatics stands. 
 
While Boyle refrained from an attempt to contrive mechanisms capable of accounting for 
pneumatics, he showed no such restraint in chemistry. That area was the main one in which 
Boyle sought for a fruitful relationship between experimental science and fundamental matter 
theory. I maintain that Boyle’s efforts in this regard did not inform his experimental chemistry 
in a productive way. In keeping with the general structure of his accommodations of 
phenomena to mechanical matter theory, Boyle sought mechanisms capable of accounting for 
chemical phenomena known by other means. The contrived character and diverse nature of the 
range of mechanisms invoked by Boyle to accommodate chemistry attests to the fact that he 
lacked, and understandably and necessarily lacked, any theory at the mechanical or corpuscular 
level capable of guiding or otherwise engaging with experiment. Whatever success Boyle had as 
a chemist, it did not stem from his mechanical matter theory and offered no significant support 
for it. These claims are based on a detailed analysis of Boyle’s attempts to contrive mechanisms 
to explain chemistry, especially those in ‘The Mechanical Origin of Qualities’ (1675), an 
essaywhich has not been given the attention it deserves. In that work Boyle can be found 
contriving more than one possible mechanism capable of explaining a specified chemical 
phenomenon. If accommodation is the aim, then two accommodations are better than one. By 
contrast, mutually incompatible explanations were not acceptable in Boyle’s experimental 
science. He modified and added to his experiments in pneumatics to rule out explanations that 
were alternatives to his own, for instance. 
 
My account and appraisal of Boyle’s chemistry conflicts with one recently advocated by William 
Newman. Both he and another Boyle scholar, Peter Anstey, have published criticisms of an 
earlier published version of my distinction between Boyle’s mechanical philosophy and his 
experimental science. The papers that these two scholars are to submit to &HPS2, combined 
with mine, should make for an interesting and productive Symposium should all three be 
accepted.  
 
